Avemaria malware
Tactical report of avemaria malware
Identification
Vendor |
Detection |
ALYac |
Trojan.PSW.AveMaria |
Kaspersky |
HEUR:Trojan-Spy.Win32.AveMaria.gen |
NANO-Antivirus |
Trojan.Win32.AveMaria.huhbnn |
The following table contains a list of artifacts that had been analyzed
within this document.
PE timestamp |
Md5 |
Size in bytes |
File name |
Description |
1992-06-19 22:22:17 UTC |
36a2061a6df7f0f3c608a8a140af14b3 |
1.29 MB (1356441 bytes) |
RFQ_282008.exe |
Loader |
Technical details
Malware packed with Borland Delphi 6.0 - 7.0 [Overlay] as shown in
figure (1).
Figure (1) |
After unpacking file, it overwrittes file and drops new overwritten file
at system directory as show in figure (2)_(3)_(4).
Figure (2) |
Figure (3) |
Figure (4) |
It enumerates printers, and captures current window as
shown in figure (5).
Figure (5) |
PE timestamp |
Md5 |
Size in bytes |
File name |
Description |
2020-06-21 Sun 17:52:21 UTC |
01BCA2E10EFD4379976B443F9E0E68B2 |
129.50 KB (132608 bytes) |
TapiUnattend.exe |
Dropper |
File protected with called yoda's Protector v1.02
(.dll,.ocx) -> Ashkbiz Danehkar (h) * as shown in figure (6).
Figure (6) |
It resolves Apies as shown in figure (7)_(8).
Figure (7) |
Figure (8) |
It creates new file called QZUebm.exe
in temp path executes file as shown in figure (9) _ (10).
Figure (9) |
Figure (10) |
It unpacks section of code during runtime as shown in
figure (11).
Figure (11) |
It determines version of operating system as shown in
figure (12).
Figure (12) |
It gets value from registry as shown in figure (13) with the following
parameters as shown in table below.
Figure (13) |
hKey |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE |
SubKey |
SOFTWARE\GTplus |
Value |
QZUebm |
It creates thread to download malicious file from as
shown in figure (14) _ (15) and executes file as shown in figure (16).
Figure (14) |
Figure (15) |
File name |
k1.rar |
Domain name |
ddos.dnsnb8.net:799/cj |
Path |
Temp path |
Full url |
"http://ddos.dnsnb8.net:799/cj//k1.rar" |
Figure (16) |
It gets Logical drive and searches for files as shown
in figure (17).
Figure (17) |
It creates file at temp path as shown in figure (18)
with the following parameters as shown in table below.
Figure (18) |
FileName |
\Temp\<8
random number and char>.bat |
Access |
GENERIC_READ|GENERIC_WRITE |
Mode |
CREATE_ALWAYS |
ShareMode |
0 |
It writes following code to previous batch and
executes as shown in figure (19) _ (20), the purpose of command is deleting
temp file QZUebm.exe.
Figure (19) |
Figure (20) |
Content of batch file
":DELFILE del "C:\Users\Mahmoud_El_Menshawy\Desktop\QZUebmexe"
if exist
"C:\Users\Mahmoud_El_Menshawy\Desktop\QZUebm.exe" goto :DELFILE
del
"C:\Users\MAHMOU~1\AppData\Local\Temp\637c1908.bat".
Note
For file k1.rar it can get screenshot of current
window, get cashes and other stealing functions. It also connects to ip address
make tcp connection to ip address 45[.]199[.]111[.]154 which is related to DXTL Tseung Kwan O Service
as shown in figure (21).
Figure (21) |
Reference:
- https://blog.vincss.net/2020/09/re016-malware-analysis-modiloader-eng.html.
- https://zero2auto.com/2020/08/20/dbatloader-modiloader-first-stage/.
- https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/warzone-behind-the-enemy-lines/.
If you wanna learn malware analysis you can check my YouTube channel I'm trying publish analysis of malware and some methods to analysis malwares.
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YouTube channel
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCParXHaBXBmqRdHuVUg21pA
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